Public Service Markets: Their Economics, Oversight and Regulation by Dassiou, X. et al.
Dassiou, X., Langham, P., Nancarrow, C., Scharaschkin, A. & Ward, D. (2014). Public Service 
Markets: Their Economics, Oversight and Regulation. London: City University London. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Dassiou, X., Langham, P., Nancarrow, C., Scharaschkin, A. & Ward, D. (2014). 
Public Service Markets: Their Economics, Oversight and Regulation. London: City University 
London. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7388/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538532 
 
 
 
CCRP Working Paper Series 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Public Service Markets: Their Economics, Oversight and Regulation 
 
 
Xeni Dassiou 
Peter Langham 
Charles Nancarrow 
Alex Scharaschkin 
Dan Ward 
Centre for Competition and Regulatory Policy (CCRP) 
City University London 
 
CCRP Working Paper No 28 
(December  2014) 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538532 
Public service markets:  their economics, oversight 
and regulation 
 
Abstract 
This paper has three aims. 
Firstly, it aims to show that the language of markets can help to frame arguments about how 
effectively public services are achieving their intended outcomes.  UsiŶg ͚ŵaƌket͛ laŶguage and 
concepts may not always be comfortable for those from a traditional policy-making background.  This 
paper suggests that thinking in these terms can nevertheless be very useful when designing 
investigations of the effectiveness of public services, whenever those services entail a degree of 
personalisation or user choice – as is currently the case, for example, in large parts of health, social 
care and education in England. 
Secondly, the paper aims to show that public service markets (public services that involve choice on 
the part of service users) differ quite fundamentally from private markets.   Hence the conditions for 
the success, or failure, of public service markets to achieve public policy intentions may be different 
from the conditions that are necessary to foster successful (well-functioning) markets in the private 
sector.   Although there are analogies between private and public markets, some of which are 
discussed, the introduction of ͚ŵaƌket ŵeĐhaŶisŵs͛ iŶto puďliĐ seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀisioŶ does Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ 
mean that the public service markets thus created will behave like private markets, or that policy 
iŶteŶtioŶs ǁill ďe aĐhieǀed siŵplǇ ďǇ ͚leaǀiŶg it to the ŵaƌket͛.  This, of course, has implications for 
how public service markets are overseen, managed, and regulated.  
In particular, the Ŷatuƌe of the ͚ goods͛ that aƌe ͚ tƌaded͛ iŶ puďliĐ seƌǀiĐe ŵaƌkets is often very different 
from those in many private markets.  This paper argues that not only are public services typically merit 
goods (characterised by positive externalities in their consumption), but that there is an important 
distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚ĐhoiĐe͛ merit goods, such as education or social care, aŶd ͚ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ͛ merit 
goods, such as probation services or welfare-to-work programmes.  Choice merit goods could in 
principle be provided through vouchers or direct payments to users, although doing so would not 
necessarily achieve other policy objectives such as universality or equity, even if all conditions were in 
place for the public market to operate efficiently (in practice, this latter requirement is also unlikely 
to be met).  There may also be conflicts between how service users actually make choices, and how 
the state ǁould ͚like͛ them to (for example, hospital patients may value proximity of the hospital to 
their home more highly than its results on clinical performance measures). 
The ͚useƌs͛ of ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ ŵeƌit goods, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, ŵaǇ Ŷot ǁish to ĐoŶsuŵe theŵ, ďut it ŵaǇ 
be welfare-enhancing for society to coerce them to do so.  The commissioning or direct provision by 
the state of such goods may meet public policy objectives more effectively than the market 
mechanism alone, as users are not able to internalise the full social benefits of their actions.  
Finally, building on these foundations, the paper discusses when public service markets are likely to 
be an effective method of achieving public policy objectives, and when they may not be.   Issues that 
arise frequently in public service markets are discussed, such as principal-agent relationships; 
determining the quality of complex experience goods; the existence of local or regional monopolies 
of provision, and monopsonies of funding; the operation of competition law in the public sector; and 
how to deal with provider failure.  The paper concludes with some suggestions for what this all means 
for those charged with overseeing public service markets in practice, based both on the preceding 
considerations, and on empirical evidence and experience to date. 
1. Introduction & background 
1. This paper sets out to test the assertion that public service markets are fundamentally different 
from regulated utilities markets [or consumer-funded public services] by exploring the extent 
to which genuine differences in market structure and product characteristics exist, as well as 
the extent to which similarities may be found.  It then looks to develop thinking on whether 
there are certain types of public services where effective outcomes are unlikely to be achieved 
fƌoŵ a ͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ iŶ the ŵaƌket͛ appƌoaĐh to deliǀeƌǇ ;͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ iŶ the ŵaƌket͛ iŶĐludes 
approaches such as personal budgets, direct payments, vouchers, free entitlements to services 
that ĐaŶ ďe ͚ƌedeeŵed͛ at a pƌoǀideƌ of ĐhoiĐe etc.). 
What are Ǯpublic servicesǯ? 
2. We use the teƌŵ ͚puďliĐ seƌǀiĐes͛ to ƌefeƌ to services that are generally regarded as essential 
enablers of participation in society.  For example, access to water and energy, as do access to 
education, health and social care. Arguably, in addition a reasonable quality internet 
ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ aŶd aĐĐess to fiŶaŶĐial seƌǀiĐes suĐh as a ďaŶk aĐĐouŶt also ĐouŶt as ͚puďliĐ 
seƌǀiĐes͛ uŶdeƌ this ďƌoad defiŶitioŶ ďut these aƌe Ŷot the ŵaiŶ foĐus of this papeƌ. Another 
way to think about these services is that they are those for which government would have to 
aĐt as ͞pƌoǀideƌ of last ƌesoƌt͟, oƌ ŵake aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts that eŶsuƌe their continuity, if their 
provision were to be put at risk.   
What is a public service market? 
3. In markets for public services there is a transactional relationship between the (citizen) user 
and the provider of the service. The user is funded at least in part by the public purse. This 
form of market is often termed ͚user choice and provider competition͛ oƌ ͚Đoŵpetition in the 
ŵaƌket͛, and is distinct from contracting or commissioning where the public authority is 
buying services on behalf of the citizen user (or often teƌŵed ͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ foƌ the ŵaƌket͛Ϳ.  
Who pays for public services? 
4. It is a political and policy decision whether public services of this kind are funded by service 
users directly (for example, by paying their water bills), or by taxpayers (for example, in the 
UK aĐĐess to the NatioŶal Health “eƌǀiĐe is ͚fƌee at the poiŶt of deliǀeƌǇ͛, the Đosts of ƌunning 
the NHS being picked up by the taxpayer).  Of course these two modes of paying for public 
services are not mutually exclusive, and public services may be funded by a mix of both.  In 
the UK, for example, most of the costs of social care are born by users directly, with the 
taxpayer only subsidising provision for the poorest; and while people pay to use train services 
by means of fares, the taxpayer covers around half the total costs of maintaining and 
enhancing rail infrastructure (through a grant from the government to the rail infrastructure 
company, Network Rail).  Of course even when government policy is to provide public services 
paƌtlǇ oƌ ǁhollǇ at the taǆpaǇeƌ͛s eǆpeŶse, pƌiǀate ŵaƌkets also ofteŶ eǆist, suĐh as pƌiǀate 
schools and hospital markets, for those who choose and are sufficiently affluent to access 
them. 
Who is responsible for ensuring public policy objectives are met? 
5. Whatever model of paying for these essential public services is adopted, arrangements must 
be made to ensure that the market of service providers, and service purchasers (either users 
directly, or the state acting as each useƌ͛s ageŶt1), functions as intended to achieve policy 
outcomes.  In the UK, and for the case of services that are paid for by users directly such as 
water, energy, telecommunications and banking, the required market oversight arrangements 
are realised through the system of independent regulation that has developed over the last 
three decades, and is implemented through bodies such as the Office of Water Regulation 
(Ofwat), the Office of Gas and Energy Markets (Ofgem), the Office for Communications 
(Ofcom), and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA—now part of the Bank of England).  
6. In public service markets, such as early years, the market can be overseen by a variety of 
organisations. For example, the sponsoring department, a sector regulator, the local authority 
or other public body, or a combination of these may be responsible for ensuring the market 
delivers the intended public policy outcomes. When government policy is implemented by 
͚ŵaƌketised͛ seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀisioŶ it brings a combination of opportunities and risks. Markets 
present opportunities for services to become more personalised, responsive, efficient, diverse 
and innovative. They also present new challenges for government; specifically the risk that 
having established markets in public services, departments and local authorities may lack the 
capability to ensure that they operate in the interests of the users and the taxpayer, rather 
than in the interests of the providers whose profits are funded by users and taxpayers. 
7. The characteristics and often complex nature of public services (discussed elsewhere in this 
paper), together with the vulnerability of many service users, requires government to establish 
independent regulatory frameworks for public services delivery. These comprise initial 
accreditation or licensing of providers, and a monitoring and inspection regime to ensure that 
quality standards are being upheld. An independent accreditation or licensing regime is 
intended to ensure that only providers that meet required national standards are allowed to 
enter the market, or stay in the market. Independent inspection regimes monitor, inspect and 
regulate providers to ensure their services continue to meet required standards, and take 
remedial action or withdraw the licence if a provider fails to do this. In education, Ofsted 
                                                          
1 Of course the state also has an obligation to the taxpayer, that its purchasing decisions should ƌepƌeseŶt ͚good 
ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ͛.  We eǆploƌe iŶ seĐtioŶ 4 some of the tensions entailed by this dual obligation for public 
servants such as commissioners of health services, who are supposed to represent the interests both of the 
service user and the taxpayer simultaneously. 
performs the role of independent quality regulator and in health and social care, this role is led 
by the Care Quality Commission. 
What are the characteristics and main kinds of markets for taxpayer-funded public 
service markets?  
8. There are different dimensions to markets for taxpayer-funded public service markets such 
as: user choice vs commissioner choice (͚Ƌuasi-ŵaƌkets͛, iŶ Le GƌaŶd͛s teƌŵiŶologǇ). Put 
another way user choice can be characterised as ͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ in the ŵaƌket͛, whereas 
͚ĐoŵŵissioŶed seƌǀiĐes͛ are where a commissioner buys public services on behalf of the public 
(this is sometimes called ͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ for the ŵaƌket͛). The buyer side of public service 
markets can be represented by many individuals each with their own personal budget, or at 
the other end of the scale a single commissioner such as a local authority who buys services 
on behalf of their community. Variants that combine a ͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ foƌ the ŵaƌket͛ appƌoaĐh 
with some element of user choice are also not uncommon, for example a local authority may 
commission domiciliary care services for the elderly in their area and deliberately contract 
with more than one provider, and allow service users to choose between a number providers. 
These arrangements may suit some users who are happy to leave commissioning of care 
provision to the authority and to retain a modicum of control by choosing between the 
commissioned social care providers. 
9. Public service markets can be composed of one or typically a range of different types of 
provider:   Publicly-funded providers, such as schools and NHS-funded hospitals;   Private businesses (owned and funded by private capital); and   Third sector providers, common forms these take are charitable or voluntary bodies, 
social enterprises and mutuals.  
What are the main product characteristics in public markets? 
10. Public services are typically ͞merit goods͟, i.e. services characterised by large positive 
externalities in their consumption. It is worth drawing attention to the distinction between 
choice (those consumed willingly) and compulsory merit goods (consumed through 
compulsion). Merit goods such as education and healthcare are consumed by choice or out of 
need by service users. These are distinct from public services such as probation services, jail 
time, workplace programmes, which users may not wish to use (and have to be coerced to 
use) which are sometimes referred to as ͚ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ͛ ŵeƌit goods. These are goods for which 
under provision or elective consumption can have seriously negative consequences for the 
non-users. Clearly user choice is not a feature of these types of services.  
 
 Market definition issues  
11. The geographical market definition is an important feature to explore in defining a public 
service market: it can be local, regional, national or even international. In most utilities͛ 
markets, competition is conducted among private ͚for profit͛ providers acting on a national 
ŵaƌket ďasis, ǁith ͞uŶĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal͟ ĐoŵpaŶies ďeiŶg the eǆĐeptioŶ ;Netǁoƌk ‘ail, Welsh 
Water). For example: 
 In energy electrons and gas molecules makes it impossible to discriminate in 
terms of source, so end-users essentially choose a service provider rather than 
a product in energy. Hence location plays no role.  
 In financial services, and higher education market definitions may extend 
beyond the national to the international. 
 In rail the regional nature has been resolved by franchises (͚competition for the 
market͛) or, in the case of electricity transmission and distribution continued 
price regulation in the face of regional or national infrastructure monopolies. 
12. On the other hand, local competition seems to be a strong characteristic of many public 
service markets and there is a plurality of provider types (͚not for profit͛ mutuals, social 
enterprises, charities, academies etc. as well as profit maximising owner-run firms and large 
shareholder companies). Providers also come in many shapes and sizes in the for-profit sector, 
from small (sometimes family-run) businesses in the care sector, right up to large-scale 
national chains that operate in many different areas. The ͚Ŷot foƌ pƌofit͛ seĐtoƌ also has a 
diverse range of provider types.  
13. Geographical constraints can be a key determinant in defining the local market from the 
perspective of consumers who live in an area, where typically there is a limit to the choice of 
local hospitals, schools (catchment areas) etc. However, some consumers are prepared to 
travel further afield for service (e.g. even travel abroad for treatment and charge the NHS 
afterwards), or even move to a different area in order to enter the catchment area of a highly-
rated school. The ͞tƌaŶsaĐtioŶ͟ Đosts, however, will deter the majority from acting this way. 
Some users view proximity to a provider as theiƌ paƌaŵouŶt ͞ƋualitǇ͟ ĐƌiteƌioŶ ǁheŶ 
exercising their choice. In addition, switching costs can be high and consumers may tend to 
stick with the local or regional dominant provider (a barrier to entry feature similar to the 
energy sector). This makes provider new entry difficult and dampens exit pressures on 
incumbents and helps to explain why seemingly poorly-performing schools, hospitals etc. 
nevertheless continue to experience demand for their services. 
14. Interestingly the recent substantial fee increase in the case of universities suggests that such 
geographical limits can be broadened with students apparently now more ready to study 
abroad to avoid the tripling of the tuition fees in England. Regulatory constraints and 
institutional set ups also play a role: the market definition can also be broadened  giving more 
choice to the consumers  as mentioned in the case of vouchers for schools which effectively 
opens up the choice of Swedish parents to include private schools as well as state schools.  
15. For the majority of network utilities, vertical unbundling ensured the introduction of effective 
competition at several stages of the value chain, while retaining the infrastructure 
components of networks separately in the form of price regulated monopolies (transmission 
and distribution networks, gas pipes, rail network, etc.) to deal with the natural monopoly 
characteristics of these segments. 
16. In the case of some public service markets there is a reliance on efficiency in the performance 
of upstream and downstream services as the user receives services at each stage of the 
process (rather than just the final product), e.g. integrated care pathways in healthcare (lines 
of procedures), probation services (need for collaboration with local authorities to 
commission work and accommodation, health services etc.), social care (coordination with 
personal care and care in the community upstream and hospitals downstream). Again the 
issue that arises here is whether efficiency in such cases is achieved through competition or 
rather through integration and collaboration between state and providers, since the 
introduction of competition through vertical unbundling could potentially be counter-
productive as integration of the delivery of substitutes may be problematic and ultimately 
economically inefficient. 
2. Regulation, oversight and funding in PSMs 
17. Utility regulation in the UK relies on a well developed system of independent sector regulators 
that over the last 30 years have accumulated a wealth of experience in promoting the interests 
of present and future consumers, promoting competition where possible and implementing 
price regulation in the absence of effective competition (Ofcom, Ofgem, Ofwat, ORR, CAA, 
FCA, etc.).  The reasons behind the development of independent regulators were:  
a) As a commitment device to enhance the credibility and predictability and assure 
companies and investors that current and future decisions would not to be governed 
by day to day politics; this was essential given the long term horizon of many 
infrastructure investments undertaken by privatised utilities as it provided assurance 
that they would get a reasonable rate of return on their investment and that the 
regulatory environment that they face would not depend on the political cycles of 
changing governments. 
b) As a depository for accumulating & deepening expertise on a particular sector and 
thus  promoting the interests of the consumers in an effective and consistent manner 
as well as promoting competition and choice where appropriate. The regulator itself 
is financially independent of the state as it is funded by the levies on the respective 
industry. 
18. In the case of public service markets (refeƌƌed to heƌeafteƌ as ͚P“Ms͛Ϳ, NHS-funded healthcare 
does have an independent economic regulator (Monitor), but other services are subjected to 
limited economic regulation with an unclear distribution of duties among different 
depaƌtŵeŶts foƌ steǁaƌdship, aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ, assessŵeŶt of the pƌoǀideƌs͛ peƌfoƌŵance, 
standards appraisal and fulfilment of contractual obligations, user satisfaction feedback 
information, and ultimately information of the funding received by government to ensure that 
the VFM process can start to operate effectively.  
19. It is important to stress that the idea of independent regulation in PSMs is limited by the fact 
that on the demand side unlike the case of utilities where customers are paying for the good, 
the funding for the public service comes from taxation; hence budget constraint 
considerations & allocation of resources by the state will always act as a constraint.  On the 
other hand, this means that the PSMs do not suffer from the conflict of whether industry 
funding should come from the customers or from taxation as we have seen recently in water 
and energy (in energy some of the green levies have been shifted to general taxation). In rail, 
regulation decisions regarding industry funding and how this is to be split between customers 
and taxpayers stays with the government.  
20. Funding in PSMs is typically from general and local taxation, unless the consumer is self-
funded wholly or up to an initial capped sum as in the case of elderly social care in England. In 
Scandinavia vouchers are given to parents to use for the school of their choice to fully or 
partially pay for the tuition fees of their child by topping up if required. As the vouchers can 
be used to both state and private schools, this importantly implies that private schools are the 
recipients of government funding. This is not a trivial issue: it implies that users are given 
discretion on how to use state funding rather than the typical standard approach where 
parents pay for state schools through taxation but then have to pay entirely from their own 
pocket if they wish to privately educate their child. Ideological issues aside, this implies an 
increase in choice for users, leading to competition between state and private schools for the 
paƌeŶts͛ Đustoŵ, thus ďƌoadeŶiŶg the ŵaƌket defiŶitioŶ aŶd plaĐiŶg the paƌeŶt iŶ the 
purchaser/commissioner seat. On the down side, it deprives the state of the savings it can 
make by parents that decide not to use the state system of education despite paying for it 
through taxation, as is the norm.   
21. The legal context is worth considering and to what extent competition law applies in these 
markets. Applying competition law to public markets is complex and largely untested; the 
provisions do not necessarily capture activities of public authorities unless certain conditions 
are met. However, public authorities should not necessarily assume that competition law does 
not apply to them. A key issue for public service markets is whether the Competition Act applies 
to public authorities, in particular whether authorities are under an obligation not to abuse a 
potentially dominant position when they operate both as a provider in the market and as a 
purchaser of services in the same market. Existing published legal advice from a trade 
association of UK care providers2 suggests that the position is complex and turns on whether a 
local authority is classed as an ͚undertaking͛ engaging in ͚economic activity͛. According to this 
source, public bodies which only engage in purchasing in a market and are not involved in the 
direct provision of goods and services in the same market are generally not ͚engaged in 
economic activity͛, and therefore do not class as ͚uŶdeƌtakiŶgs͛ foƌ the puƌposes of the 
Competition Act. The presumption that public authorities in these circumstances are outside 
the scope of competition law was the basis of a Spanish healthcare case heard by the European 
Court of Justice.3 A trade association for Spanish medical technology providers attempted to 
sue the Spanish health system for abuse of a dominant position, because it was a near-
monopsony purchaser of their services and was accused of taking advantage of its position for 
example taking many weeks to pay invoices. The court found that the Spanish health system 
was not acting as an undertaking in this case. The legal position, however, of public bodies in 
public service markets still needs further clarification, in particular for those that engage in a 
mixture of purchasing and the direct provision of goods or services of a commercial nature (i.e. 
foƌ ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ puƌposes͟Ϳ.  
22. Public authorities may (knowingly or unwittingly) exert substantial buyer power in a local 
market and depress prices below competitive levels, and force providers to accept 
unsustainable prices. This may not only have undesirable effects for providers on their 
sustainability and severely limit market supply, but also it could inadvertently hamper the 
public authority in meeting its statutory duties to ensure adequate provision in its area. Whilst 
applying competition law is complex and public authorities acting solely as buyers may not 
necessarily be captured by its provisions, authorities still need to act with care. Courts may 
still judge that they have acted unfairly, even if their actions are not directly caught by the 
prohibition against abusing a dominant market position. For example, in a court case in 2012 
                                                          
2 Guidance to UKHCA members on UK Competition law issues, UK Homecare Association Factsheet, December 
2007. 
3 A summary of the Fenin case can be found at: http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/Fenin  
a gƌoup of loĐal Đaƌe pƌoǀideƌs ĐhalleŶged a loĐal authoƌitǇ͛s deĐisioŶ to offeƌ Ŷo iŶĐƌease iŶ 
fees aŶd took it foƌ judiĐial ƌeǀieǁ. The judge oŶ this oĐĐasioŶ Ƌuashed the loĐal authoƌitǇ͛s 
decision on several counts including on the grounds that the judge considered that the 
authority was abusing its dominant position. 
23. There is also neither a coherent institutional nor a legislative framework in most cases that 
determines who is responsible to ensure effective economic regulation and competition, VFM 
and quality standards into the market. While it is expected that the CMA will scrutinise such 
markets, it is unlikely that it would do so at a local level, if the latter is small. The investigation 
by the OFT (see February ϮϬϭϰ ƌepoƌtͿ of the higheƌ eduĐatioŶ seĐtoƌ oŶ the UŶiǀeƌsities͛ 
Terms and Conditions is such an example, the market definition for the sector is national (124 
universities as used by the OFT inquiry) but it is possibly becoming international (following a 
drastic increase in undergraduate tuition fees and the development of UK courses in English 
across Europe), which is atypical for the majority of quasi markets.  
3. Why public service markets need oversight – market 
failures 
24. Is there an economic justification for regulation in PSMs? In the case of utilities typically the 
goods are well defined in their characteristics, and hence price and output decisions are the 
result of demand and supply market forces.  The companies in such industries have an interest 
to create artificial complexity in the hope of creating switching costs through the  introduction 
of complex bundle tariffs  as in energy, mobile telecoms, etc. which give rise to menu and 
search costs. Such moves are designed by companies to impede effective competition by 
creating consumer inertia and relying on loss aversion, framing and other consumer 
ďehaǀiouƌal ďiases to ƌestƌiĐt the ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ aďilitǇ to aĐĐess, assess aŶd aĐt oŶ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
(3 As).  In so far as this is the case, such strategies can be effectively dealt with by using the 
competition toolkit and it is not necessary to resort to regulation.  
25. In the early years of deregulation in utilities, as the user is typically the payer, well established 
techniques of price cap setting (e.g. RPI-X) were in place in these market segments where 
competition was not yet effective in order to avoid monopoly power abuse of the customers 
by the sellers. The segments where this still applies today are the infrastructure segments with 
natural monopoly characteristics; typically the customers in such price regulated segments 
are not the end users, but upstream and downstream companies e.g. transmission or 
distribution pricing, etc. Price caps, and, more generally, ex ante regulation is considered as a 
temporary necessity before the forces of competition were fully developed in a market. Once 
this is the case, the customer is protected by competition, choice and the effective 
enforcement of competition law. Vertical unbundling and technological change have made 
possible the removal of natural monopoly characteristics in many segments of the value chain. 
Thus market failure in utilities was eliminated, and with it the main case for regulation. As 
effective competition flourished, price caps are no longer present in markets such a retail gas 
and electricity, generation, telecoms, etc., while the role of the regulator has evolved to one 
of providing information to the consumers to alleviate their information asymmetries and 
enable effective choices, as well as enforcing competition. 
26. In the case of PSMs, there are a number of market failures that may justify state or regulatory 
intervention: some are features of the characteristics of the service or of the users i.e. the 
demand-side, whilst others are a product of the supply-side. 
DEMAND-SIDE MARKET FAILURES 
Merit goods 
27. Services are typically merit goods i.e. characterised by large positive externalities in their 
consumption. Economic theory identifies this as a clear market failure that justifies 
government intervention.  
28. Education, health and social care are typical examples of ͞choice͟ merit goods (case example 
– Figure 1) where while the good is not public (i.e. the service is both rival and excludable), the 
marginal social benefit of the service significantly exceeds the marginal private benefit. Of 
course, there are some distinct types of healthcare that may require some compulsion in their 
consumption (e.g. the need to inoculate the population to protect them from a dangerous 
communicative disease), or choice is impossible (ambulance and A&E services) or the need to 
make parents send their children to school.  
Figure 1: Case example - social care 
Social care is characterised by having positive externalities (a civilised society expects those people 
needing care and without sufficient financial means to have their care needs met). The private 
care market caters for those able to pay for their own care, however left to the market alone care 
would be under-consumed leaving vulnerable people without financial means to fend for 
themselves, which explains why government funds social care. When users do not pay for a service 
there is a risk of over-consumption, so government needs a system of gate-keepers (e.g. GPs, care 
professionals) to ensure only eligible recipients receive publicly-funded care. 
29. These goods are such that while state funding is justified to avoid under consumption, in 
principle there is no reason why the state could not just hand vouchers to users and let them 
choose a supplier, if they are in a position to do so effectively. The reason why this does not 
happen even if we assume hypothetically that all the users had the ability to effectively choose 
in this manner (plurality of providers, free entry and exit in the market, ability to access, assess 
and act on information, etc.) is that the state may wish to pursue different objectives like 
equality, fairness as well as budget constraint considerations, which will not necessarily be 
achieved if users choose providers in an unconstrained manner. 
30. The otheƌ ŵaiŶ ĐategoƌǇ of ŵeƌit good aƌe kŶoǁŶ as ͞ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ͟ ŵeƌit goods: these are 
services where user choice is either not desirable and/or their consumption is not optional. 
Typically the majority does not consume these goods/services (e.g. are not the direct 
beneficiaries), but are strongly affected by the negative externalities caused by their absence, 
or their underproduction in quantity and quality.  For example, goods like probation services, 
jail services, workplace programmes, are merit goods for which under provision or elective 
consumption can have seriously negative consequences for the non users. The goods in 
question are tax funded and the justification for this lies in the market failure caused by the 
considerable externalities of these goods to all people (the majority of which are non-users!), 
rather that the minority who are their direct users and who may not wish to use them, but may 
be welfare – enhancing to coerce them to do so.  
31.  While private markets may satisfy part of the demand for merit goods, in order for the society 
to reach the optimum level of output provision and avoid under consumption of the good 
what is required is either: 
 subsidies (as already mentioned in principle the government could give vouchers or 
assign budgets to families to meet their health and/or education needs; personal 
budgets or user entitlements now exist in a number of public services). However, 
subsidies may be preferable if the state wants to pƌeǀeŶt ͞uŶdesiƌaďle͟ outĐoŵes 
steŵŵiŶg fƌoŵ a ŵisŵatĐh ďetǁeeŶ puďliĐ poliĐǇ oďjeĐtiǀes fuŶded ďǇ taǆpaǇeƌs͛ 
money and the preferences of the users), or   commissioning, or state provision of the good, to ensure the wider social benefits of 
these services (e.g. probation services, work placement services, waste management 
services). The latter, alongside the existing private provision where it exists (as in 
health and education, care, etc.),  should give an outcome closer to the socially 
optimum, that satisfies the wider public policy objectives that the market mechanism 
alone will not meet as the users are not able to internalise the full social benefits of 
their actions.  
Complex, experience goods 
32. While in the case of utilities the goods and services provided are usually standard products 
with well defined physical attributes, in the case of PSMs the goods can be complex and 
personalised services that are ͚experience͛ (or eǀeŶ ͚credence͛Ϳ goods with different quality 
attributes and features. For instance, across all types of care, quality is heavily reliant on 
individual relationships with care workers, and it is therefore difficult to determine the quality 
of the service before purchase. Figure 2 illustrates some of the characteristics of healthcare 
which contribute to the difficulty in assessing and measuring the quality of the treatment 
concerned with certainty.  
Figure 2: Attributes of some types of healthcare  
 
It is often difficult to measure the quality of healthcare. Many components of a health service that 
commissioners or patients value are difficult or impossible to measure. Some of the reasons for 
this can be: 
* Time lags – e.g. a good indicator of the quality of a cancer service would be how many patients 
survive for ten years after treatment. But to find this out you have to wait ten years, by which 
point the service offered might have changed completely. 
* Difficulty of establishing a counterfactual – for example, if a patient has an operation and is left 
in severe pain afterwards, it can be hard to tell if this is due to an unusually bad surgeon or to a 
good surgeon dealing with an unusually severe injury.  
* Problems of attribution – the NH“ is oŶlǇ oŶe faĐtoƌ affeĐtiŶg a patieŶt͛s life, aŶd theiƌ loŶg-
term health outcomes are also affected by things like their lifestyle, their age and their genes. It 
is diffiĐult to kŶoǁ to ǁhat eǆteŶt a patieŶt͛s health outcomes are attributable to the care they 
received. 
33. Moreover by their nature some of these goods are major life decisions with little room for 
switching in the case of a poor choice (school, university, social care, health care) without 
significant inconvenience and disruption. In the case of a frail, elderly resident in a care home, 
their original choice of the care home may have been poor owing to it being made in a hurry 
and at a time of mental distress. The prospect however of switching homes may be too big a 
disruption for them to even contemplate and the individual effectively becomes ͚locked in͛ to 
that provider. This means that the user / consumer is either: 
a. not in a position to engage effectively in the market and exercise choice or switch 
in the normal way because of problems accessing, assessing and acting on 
information, given the asymmetry of information between providers and users; 
experiential/ credence characteristics of some types of public services, and / or the 
disruption and inconvenience of switching provider. Or, 
b. for compulsory merit goods, it is not desirable that the consumer takes a decision 
as it is preferable that the state decides on the level of consumption and provision 
(jail services etc.). 
34. In the asymmetry of information case, the PSMs share a market failure that makes them 
similar to financial services.  
Principal – agent issue 
35. Additionally, whereas in utility markets the good is purchased by the user who pays the price 
and the providers meet this demand, in the case of PSMs this is different: the user is not 
necessarily the buyer of the service (as this may be commissioned on their behalf) and they 
typically do not pay for it. Choice and competition may exist; or choice may be exercised on 
behalf of the user by an agent or at least with the advice of an agent say, a GP.   
36. This again has similarities with consumers taking financial decisions with the advice of an 
intermediary/broker/adviser or more recently comparison websites, in choosing financial 
products, e.g. mortgages, personal pensions, ISAs, etc. The problem is whether the agent (say, 
the GP in healthcare) is incentivised in such a way so as to promote the interests of the 
principal, who is in this case the service user. The position is further compounded by the dual 
role of the GP as a budget holder and a prescriber of the most appropriate treatment. The 
type of provider can also plaǇ a ƌole as ǁell: the ƌaisoŶ d͛etƌe of a ŵutual ĐoŵpaŶǇ is the 
pƌoŵotioŶ of the Đustoŵeƌs͛ iŶteƌests, thus alleǀiatiŶg pƌoďleŵs of asǇŵŵetric information 
between users and providers. We discuss this further below.  
37. Even in the cases where the user does exercise choice by purchasing the service directly and 
without an agent (this may take the form of an ear-marked budget or vouchers), the user͛s 
choice is restricted by the funding for the service from the relevant local authority (in fact for 
example with school choice it would be more accurate to say that the user (the parent) can 
state a preference rather than being able to exercise the right to choose which school their 
child attends). Hence the choice of available school places are restricted by how many schools 
there are in the area, as well as the capacity of these schools. Also it is restricted by what the 
user considers as substitutes which may be:  
 the result of geographical considerations (proximity),   the way funding is provided as we have seen in the case of vouchers used in schools 
in Scandinavia which may broaden the market definition to include the private sector, 
or   the result of suďstaŶtial pƌiĐe ĐhaŶges as ǁe haǀe seeŶ iŶ the Đase of uŶiǀeƌsities͛ 
market definition slowly evolving from national to international, or regulatory 
constraints (e.g. school catchment areas, GP registration restrictions, etc). We return 
to the market definition issues in PSMs below. 
38. Similarly to the financial services regulation there is a lot of asymmetric information between 
the buyers and the sellers in such markets both in terms of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. A reflection of the latter can be seen in the spectacular collapse of many of the 
providers in the financial industry that had to be bailed out by the government during the 
economic crisis. In the case of PSMs, where assets are owned by independent organisations 
rather than government, there is a risk of moral hazard whereby failed organisations can 
exploit public demand for service continuity by demanding bail outs or excessive returns for 
investment.  
Over-consumption 
39. Given that unlike utilities markets, many of the quasi-markets are characterised by extensive 
tax funded provision, there is a need for gate keepers to avoid over-consumption when 
excludability is difficult to enforce and the user does not pay. Hence a GP is not only a provider 
of information (intermediary), but also a gatekeeper to the health system. This means that as 
an agent he may face conflicting incentives in his dual role, unless incentives are properly set 
to correct this. 
40. Interestingly, referral by a GP is necessary even in the case where the patient elects to go 
private. This is because private healthcare is not only provided by the 200 or so private 
hospitals, but also on private patient units in NHS hospitals. There is clearly some degree of 
competition for scarce resources as private health care providers rely to some extent on the 
infrastructure and resources of the state ones (and vice versa for less serious routine 
operations, with the NHS using private providers to alleviate waiting lists problems) resulting 
to a degree of complementarity as opposed to substitutability on the supply side.  It should 
be noted that there have been state attempts to mimic this complementarity in secondary 
education, by asking private schools to share some of their human resources and 
infrastructure in the provision of state education. 
 
SUPPLY-SIDE – MARKET FAILURES 
Provider-purchaser separation and weak market mechanisms 
41. Public service markets aƌe ofteŶ ͞ thiŶ͟ aŶd ĐaŶ take the foƌŵ of loĐal oƌ ƌegioŶal ŵaƌkets ǁith 
a bilateral monopoly or a monopsony. When a local authority commissions services it may 
face a single provider, or its buyer power may give it monopsonistic power in a local market. 
It is hoped that a movement from a bilateral monopoly to one where there is plurality of 
different types of providers will assist with cost discovery that will enable the government to 
set a fair price (tariff) for the service through benchmarking, as well as providing the market 
with comparators not only in terms of costs but also in terms quality. Figure 3 shows the 
different types of market situation that government may face in PSMs, and the type of 
interventions that may be necessary to ensure that policy objectives are met. 
Figure 3: Different types of market situation in public service markets 
 
42. In some PSMs competition is either set in terms of price and quality as in social care and work 
placement services, whereas in others the government sets a fixed price to providers and asks 
them to compete in terms of quality when the latter is more difficult to determine than the 
former in quality (school academies, hospitals, etc.).  In both cases the replacement of a 
bilateral monopoly with that of a monopsony, by introducing plurality on the provision side, 
will raise issues of finance-ability of the providers as the price set by the commissioning 
authority will need to sustain supply at acceptable levels as well as ensuring that it is reflective 
of the cost of provision without adversely affecting quality.  
43. Separation of the providers from the commissioning side introduces coordination problems, 
transaction costs in contracting if the product is difficult to define or difficult to verify the value 
for money and quality of provision (for example where there is no public sector comparator). 
All this is compounded by the dearth of data or inconsistency in data collecting between 
different LAs. As an alternative the state can itself provide the service either exclusively 
(effectively eliminating the principal agent problem) or along with other providers thus 
retaining a public sector comparator to the mix by being one of the providers at least until the 
problem of asymmetry of information regarding costs is resolved (at which point the public 
sector firm can become a spin-off). To illustrate the problems, in the case of health, while 
there was initially hope that nearly all of the NHS contracts would be awarded through 
competitive bidding, there is now an acceptance that non-competitive contracting is 
sometimes the best choice if the process is transparent and clearly benefits the patients.  
44. This is strikingly reminiscent of the Swedish healthcare experience where separation between 
purchasers-providers (p-p) was put in place in 2003. The split proved ineffective because of a 
lack of contracting know how by the purchasers which led to them being dominated by 
providers due to a greater knowledge and information by the latter. Contracts were 
insufficiently specific which led to a lack of clarity of organisational roles as purchasers 
eventually took additional roles on specifying inputs rather than just outputs/outcomes.  In 
the end this led to either the p-p split being modified/ terminated or a shift of the emphasis 
over the years in achieving efficiency through collaboration and coordination between local 
authorities and providers rather than efficiency through competition contracting.  
Barriers to entry and exit. 
45. A lack of contracting capability can be problematic not only on the side of the commissioning 
authority, but also from the side of the suppliers which may lead to barriers to entry for 
smaller inexperienced suppliers. An example of this can be found in utilities regulation 
concerning the regulatory burden in the supply of electricity and gas. According to the State 
of the Market Assessment Report (OFT, OFGEM & CMA, March 2014, page 13) the industry is 
governed by a number of codes. The complexity and costs of compliance is burdensome and 
can place at a disadvantage smaller suppliers that can ill afford such costs. Similarly mutuals 
and other small suppliers may find it difficult to survive once their preferential treatment in 
being awarded contracts expires and complex licensing/ procurement/ regulatory structures 
develop. On the other hand, a continuing preferential setting for smaller firms/mutuals will 
create a disincentive to grow up, thus creating barriers to expansion (perverse incentives). 
This is not a novel concern; it features in the market for electricity and gas, where the 
existence of a size threshold below which a supplier is not required to meet social and 
environmental obligations may act as a barrier to expansion. We return to barriers to entry, 
supply competition and ownership structures below. 
Natural monopoly characteristics 
46. Natural monopoly characteristics as in the case of hospitals which can be viewed a little bit 
like distribution companies in energy: regional monopolists. Additionally, both are 
characterised by asset specificity. It should be noted that in other sectors, such as elderly care, 
asset specificity is less of a problem; for example care homes can be transformed in flats. On 
the other hand jails cannot. There are also parts of healthcare services such as diagnostic 
services that are characterised by very large capital costs. In such cases it may be appropriate 
for GPs to lease such services by a single provider who owns the equipment. Figure 4 illustrates 
some of these issues for healthcare services. 
 
Figure 4: barriers to entry in healthcare markets 
 
Foƌ ŵaŶǇ healthĐaƌe seƌǀiĐes, the pƌoǀideƌ side of the ŵaƌket is likelǇ to ďe ǀeƌǇ ͚thiŶ͛ iŶ ŵaŶǇ 
parts of the country. This happens for multiple reasons:  
* The geographic market for many healthcare services is quite narrow. Patients are unwilling to 
travel 500 miles for GP appointments (although they may be willing to do so for specialist 
treatment). 
* Many services have very high fixed costs (radiotherapy machines cost millions of pounds)  
* Many services (such as A&E Departments) have large economies of scale or scope, possibly even 
rising to the level of natural monopoly. 
* In rural areas demand is sparse, reducing the number of providers that can be supported.  
 
47. If a ŵaƌket ĐaŶ oŶlǇ suppoƌt oŶe oƌ tǁo pƌoǀideƌs, ͚ĐoŵpetitioŶ iŶ the ŵaƌket͛ is uŶlikelǇ to 
work effectively. And the same factors which make these markets thin in the first place can 
often create significant barriers to entry, meaning competition for the market is not feasible 
either. In some cases you may in fact end up with a bilateral monopoly, with a single 
commissioner negotiating with a single provider. This leads to the usual inefficiencies which 
come with bargaining. 
48. This is a bit like ROSCOs leasing engines and carriages to train companies or companies owning 
airplanes leasing aircraft to airlines. We can treat this as infrastructure bottleneck facilities 
and price regulate for fair access price to the use of such services by GPs. (the equivalent of 
transmission access prices). 
Supply competition, ownership structures and exit 
49. Exit in PSMs, creates the problem of who takes over (e.g. failing sixth form colleges). What 
happens to consumers facing failing providers if there are no other providers in the market? 
As mentioned this may give rise to moral hazard issues that can be exploited by a provider to 
demand a bail out or additional funding and removing damage efficiency incentives by 
removing the threat of exit from the market as a punishment for inefficiency. For example, in 
2011 the UK social care sector only survived the potentially disorderly exit of the largest care 
bed provider as a result of considerable effort by a number of organisations and individuals, 
without formal processes and powers to call upon to ensure an orderly exit.4 
50. Public services such as health, social care and eduĐatioŶ aƌe esseŶtial to ŵaŶǇ people͛s liǀes, 
which require government to ensure arrangements are in place to maintain continuity of 
service in order that harm or detriment to users is avoided (such as reduced educational 
outcomes, or physical harm or even death in the case of health or care), and policy 
objectives are met. Public authorities must ensure that arrangements exist to guarantee 
service continuity in the event of provider failure or exit.  For this reason, effective oversight 
in public services can require government to monitor the financial health of key providers in 
order to assess the degree of risk that exists in the market to service continuity for users.  
51. Government has to avoid however providing explicit or implicit guarantees to support 
providers that fall into financial difficulties, for this could risk weakening the incentives on 
providers to manage their own businesses and maintain their financial viability. The 
government therefore has to balance the need for poorly-performing providers to exit the 
market with the need to protect users by ensuring continuity of service. 
52. Does ownership structure matter in outcomes?  The emergence of mutuals may deliver better 
outcomes for their customers as by the very nature of their ownership such firms overcome 
asymmetric information problems. In contrast, shareholder owned firms will promote the 
interests of their managers as well as the shareholders and will typically take advantage of the 
asymmetric information on the side of the users/purchasers. Similarly,  owner managed 
companies will go for profit maximisation; if they know that their customers are unable to 
discern quality (in the short-term anyway) then again there is little prospect of the provider 
being punished for providing poor service, thus dampening exit pressures (e.g. barriers to 
exit). Reputation and competitive pressure may do the trick; comparators are required to 
make sharecropping less of a problem as they reduce the asymmetry of information. 
53. Does ownership structure matter in order to survive? As we mentioned earlier, initially 
mutuals and other start-ups face a favourable climate in contracts awarding etc., but what 
happens as these are phased out and a complex licensing/procurement/regulatory structure   
develops. A continuing preferential setting for smaller firms/mutuals means that these will 
have a disincentive to grow up, in order to avoid facing a more hostile procurement 
environment (e.g. perverse incentives)  once they do. 
 
                                                          
4 Oversight in Adult Social Care, The consultation response, Department of Health, May 2013, page 5. 
4. Practical considerations for overseeing public service 
markets  
Rules for ensuring a competitive market 
54. Like private markets, PSMs need rules that govern competition in the market and these rules 
need to be enforced where appropriate. Competition law which prohibits anti-competitive 
behaviour (or practices) applies to all private sector providers operating in PSMs. It should also 
capture, in most circumstances, not-for-profit providers and publicly-funded providers that 
operate in similar markets. However, it is less clear whether it applies to public sector buyers 
(where they do not act as providers in the same market). Public bodies should also bear in 
mind that their conduct may also (or alternatively) be subject to other laws within the field of 
competition law, including public procurement, merger control and state aid laws. 
Competition powers may be an imperfect tool for publicly-funded providers 
55. As stated earlier, the Competition Act is largely un-tested in public service markets. It is 
unclear to what extent competition bodies would pursue the full force of enforcement action 
against publicly-funded providers that infringe competition law. Enforcement action that 
leads to financial penalties being imposed on a public body for a breach of competition law, 
are likely to have to be met from the budget of the public body; this could in turn impact 
adversely on the level of public services available to users. However if the competition body 
decides not to pursue enforcement action against a publicly-funded provider this could create 
tension with other priorities or principles that competition bodies pursue:  
• Equal treatment: the competition authority risks being seen as treating 
providers unequally if, in similar circumstances, it proceeds against private providers 
with the full rigour of competition law but publicly-funded providers do not suffer 
similar sanctions. In addition, such a scenario Đould lead to a ͚ĐhilliŶg effeĐt͛ ǁhiĐh 
makes private providers less willing to invest and engage in the market.   
• Deterrence: similarly the deterrent effect will be lost if competition 
authorities do not take enforcement action against providers who infringe the law; 
which may risk giving misleading signals to other publicly-funded providers in the 
market that they too may not face enforcement action if they transgress.   
 
56. However, in guidance issued by the Office of Fair Trading to public bodies on applying 
competition law, it emphasises that a level playing field and a similar commitment to 
compliance should exist in those markets, particularly in mixed markets in which public bodies 
engage in economic activities, alongside private firms and third sector organisations.5 It makes 
clear that where competition law does apply to a public body it could potentially expect to 
                                                          
5 Public bodies and competition law, A guide to the application of the Competition Act 1998; OFT 1389, 2011, 
paragraph 4.2. 
face adverse consequences such as reputational impact; the possibility of financial penalties 
and or civil claims for damages.6 
57. This gives an indication of some of the types of considerations that competition bodies are 
required to balance when they consider applying competition law in relation to public bodies 
acting as providers in PSMs. It is therefore important that government works with the 
competition authorities to help raise awareness of the conditions under which competition 
rules could apply to public ďodies͛ involvement in the public services markets they oversee. 
This could include outlining and illustrating the types of behaviours and practices that should 
be avoided.  
58. This still leaves the question however of how the government and competition authorities 
should deal with public sector buyers who are not captured by the provisions of competition 
law but potentially abuse their market position. The guidance suggests that in response to 
competition concerns in a PSM (which may or may not be captured by the provisions of the 
Competition Act) the competition authority may decide to use its tools flexibly and apply a 
range of measures; for example, advocacy work to help raise awareness, or a study to explore 
competition issues arising in that market suĐh as the iŵpaĐt of puďliĐ ďodies͛ ďuǇeƌ poǁeƌ oŶ 
the sustainability of provision (and where appropriate refer for a more detailed market 
investigation).7  
Alternatives to competition powers to mitigate buyer power of public bodies: 
ombudsman and dispute resolution schemes 
59. Where competition law is not deemed to apply to a public body that has buyer power (or it is 
unclear if the law applies), an alternative approach can be for the provider to invoke a dispute 
resolution clause in their contract with the public body, particularly if this refers to mediation 
or alternative dispute resolution. Both are generally far cheaper than going to court and 
should allow the parties to continue to engage in a commercial relationship. In various sectors 
of the economy statutory provision for a form of alternative dispute resolution already exists: 
 In the communications markets covered by the Communications Act 2003, disputes on 
matters not covered by competition law or in the scope of other regulatory or legal 
powers, communications providers can raise a regulatory dispute which requires the 
regulator (Ofcom) to use its regulatory powers to resolve.   An adjudication scheme has also been set up to cover the groceries market, and in 
particular the buyer / supplier relationship. The job of the independent groceries code 
adjudicator is to judge disputes between the suppliers and supermarkets (i.e. buyers with 
market power) where unfair, or abusive treatment is alleged.  In financial services, provision is additionally made for smaller businesses (as well as 
consumers) to complain to the Financial Ombudsman Service if they feel they have been 
treated unfairly, and if upheld, they can order the complainant to be compensated for 
their loss. 
                                                          
6 Public bodies and competition law, OFT 1389, 2011, paragraph 4.8-4.9. 
7 Public bodies and competition law, OFT 1389, 2011, paragraphs 4.10-4.11. 
60. An EU directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution schemes that are available to help 
complainants resolve their dispute outside court is currently being consulted on by the UK 
Government. If parties to a dispute are unable to settle their differences, ADR offers a quicker 
and cheaper means of resolving that dispute. Ombudsman schemes already exist as a back-
stop for service users of local government and the NHS where existing complaint-handling 
processes have not resolved the problem to the satisfaction of the user. Whilst public service 
markets are out of the scope of this EU directive, in principle consideration could be given to 
setting up similar dispute resolution schemes as an avenue of potential redress for providers 
of public services who are in dispute with commissioners, as a way of providing quick and 
cheap resolution (instead of having to take matters through the courts). 
Other rules for effective public service markets 
61. As publiĐ seƌǀiĐes aƌe ͚ŵeƌit goods͛ the state ƌeƋuiƌes these seƌǀiĐes aƌe uŶiǀeƌsallǇ aǀailaďle 
to all those deemed eligible for them, as the benefits of mandating their provision on a free 
and universal basis for society as a whole is deemed to outweigh the costs of their provision 
to the taxpayer. To meet these public policy objectives, government also has in place rules 
and or financial incentives that sit alongside regulation of markets by competition law. These 
rules may, for example, be intended to ensure minimum standards or equity in provision, or 
to discourage certain types of discriminatory practice by market participants.  
62. Alongside universality and equity, the protection of the vulnerable is another key concept in 
the provision of public services. The characteristics and often complex nature of public 
services (discussed elsewhere in this paper), together with the vulnerability of many service 
users, requires government to establish independent regulatory frameworks for public 
services delivery. These comprise initial accreditation or licensing of providers, and a 
monitoring and inspection regime to ensure that quality standards are being upheld. An 
independent accreditation or licensing regime is intended to ensure that only providers that 
meet required national standards are allowed to enter the market, or stay in the market. 
Independent inspection regimes monitor, inspect and regulate providers to ensure their 
services continue to meet required standards, and take remedial action or withdraw the 
licence if a provider fails to do this. In education, Ofsted performs the role of independent 
quality regulator and in healthcare and social care, this role is led by the Care Quality 
Commission. 
 
Enabling users to participate actively in the market 
63. As in other consumer markets, a lack of good information and advice can act as a barrier to an 
effectively-functioning market. In public service markets where user choice is the means of 
service allocation, government can help create the conditions for an efficient market by 
enabling users to participate actively in the market. Users need access to good quality 
information to inform their choice, as well as help to assess it. They also need to be able to 
feel they can act on their choice. This means enabling users to switch providers if they wish 
(without causing them undue distress and inconvenience), as well as ensuring effective means 
of redress exist for users who experience poor quality or inadequate provision.  
Dimensions of information for users    
64. As explained earlier, public services have unusual characteristics which can inhibit the ability 
of users to make effective choices. These can be intrinsic to the type of service; in the case of 
͚eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ oƌ ͚ĐƌedeŶĐe͛ goods the outĐoŵes for the user can be largely unknown in 
advance, making it difficult to make a well-informed choice. Some public services are by their 
Ŷatuƌe Đoŵpleǆ aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ ƋualitǇ aŶd outĐoŵes ŵaǇ ďe uŶsatisfaĐtoƌǇ fƌoŵ a useƌ͛s 
perspective for any number of reasons: incompleteness; difficulty in its interpretation, or in 
its comparability; not covering all aspects of relevance to the user.  
65. The various ratings and user-experience feedback surveys in the higher education sector have 
developed and been refined over a number of years, and provide prospective students with a 
rich resource of information. Nevertheless such user information has to be managed, 
interpreted and presented properly if users are to benefit from it. The energy market is an 
example of where consumers can become easily confused by the plethora of information on 
different rates available which can reach a tipping point where the market is no longer working 
in the interests of consumers. Various market solutions have emerged to help consumers 
navigate the plethora of tariffs and find the best deals for their energy needs. In what is likely 
to reduce competitive pressures in the market, Government is acting to reduce drastically the 
number of tariffs available in an attempt to deal ǁith the ͞ĐoŶfusopolǇ͟ pƌoďleŵ that 
commentators had highlighted. In other areas, for example healthcare, attempts to create 
tools to inform user choice have been less systematic and are a lot less well developed to date. 
The recent Friends and Family test introduced post-Francis Report is an attempt to introduce 
a ŵoƌe sǇsteŵatiĐ appƌoaĐh to pƌoǀide poteŶtial useƌs ǁith a ďetteƌ idea of past useƌs͛ 
experiences of the healthcare they received at a hospital.  
66. Owing to its specialist nature, however, patients are likely to need to rely on the advice and 
support of healthcare professionals to ensure they receive appropriate treatment and can 
effectively navigate the system. Healthcare is not the only public service where users may 
require the advice and support of an intermediary. Social care users can benefit from the 
expert advice and support in tailoring a suitable package of care to meet their needs. However, 
the incentives on professionals iŶ the ͚sǇsteŵ͛ may not always converge with the interests of 
the user. For example, a GP may have to balance the wishes of the user for an expensive 
course of treatment or package of care, with pressures on their Practice budget, and the wider 
interests of the taxpayer. For these reasons and others (such as fitting in with existing local 
commissioning arrangements), professionals may feel constrained in the choices they are 
prepared to offer patients, and more likely to default to existing care patterns and pathways 
unless otherwise prompted by the patient or their advocate. 
67. However in some areas, for example social care, personal budget holders may have access to 
alternative sources of advice which can help support them in deciding how to meet their 
individual care needs. User-led organisations (some of these have been spun-off as social 
enterprises from the public sector), independent brokers and those who offer peer-support 
can offer advice, support and advocacy to users which is independent of the ͚ sǇsteŵ͛. The OFT 
found in research it carried out on so-Đalled ͚ĐhoiĐe tools͛ that qualitative feedback on 
consumer experience can help make complex decisions and comparisons easier for users.8  
Consumer redress  
68. Whilst the national quality regulators (such as Ofsted and CQC) provide service quality 
oversight, strong public service markets also need effective redress mechanisms that enable 
individual users who have experienced poor service, or are dissatisfied, to complain and obtain 
a satisfactory response. This is particularly so given the essential nature of these services and 
the inherently complex, experiential and personal features of some of these types of services 
(discussed earlier in this paper). These features make it more difficult for users to make well-
informed decisions in the first place about which provider to choose, and also can present 
barriers to switching provider making it very inconvenient and disruptive for the individual to 
switch. Redress mechanisms are also an area where good information and advice can play a 
key role as it allows users to have a better idea of the standards they have a right to expect and 
how they can raise concerns.9  
69. In addition, also discussed earlier, some public service markets have geographical constraints 
which can be a key determinant in defining the local market from the perspective of users who 
live in an area. Typically there may be a limit to the choice of local hospitals, schools etc., or, 
as in some areas and for some services, no effective choice. If the local market lacks real 
competitive pressures, genuine choice, and switching is not a realistic proposition for many 
users in an area, the accessibility of effective redress is vital. Otherwise users may have little 
prospect of proper redress if the services they receive are sub-standard and need improving.  
70. Current research from the United Kingdom shows a general lack of understanding about the 
role or importance of redress mechanisms in public markets. For example, recent research by 
the UK consumer organisation Which? found that services are poorly organised leading to a 
͚ĐoŵplaiŶts ŵaze͛ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶsuŵeƌs fiŶd haƌd to Ŷaǀigate. WhiĐh?͛s suƌǀeǇ of ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁho 
had experienced a problem with public services found that over a third did not complain, and 
over half of those did not take their problem further following a first complaint. The main 
reasons cited were: scepticism that their complaint would have any impact; a lack of 
understanding of the complaints process; and, fear of repercussions for the quality of ongoing 
services where there was a personal relationship between complainant and provider. Clearly 
there are some significant impediments to this element of public service markets working 
effectively. 
Promoting healthy competition between providers 
Diversity of providers and a level playing field  
71. PSMs typically have a range of different types of provider. In some sectors (for example, 
hospitals, schools, higher education institutions), the publicly-funded providers still represent 
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the norm, whilst ͚Ŷot-for-pƌofit͛ aŶd ͚foƌ-pƌofit͛ providers are largely marginal participants in 
such markets. In some markets such as social care, the situation is almost the opposite; 
publicly-funded providers are scarce (most local authorities are no longer involved in direct 
provision any more) and private or not-for-profit providers represent the bulk of provision in 
most areas. In other markets such as nursery and childcare education, the picture is mixed with 
a more even split between public and private providers. 
72. Some of the factors that OFT guidance has identified as acting as barriers to a level playing field 
between providers are: differences in regulation, taxation and pensions treatment between 
different types of provider; incumbency advantages enjoyed by existing firms, such as access 
to information, pre-qualification and bid criteria, and transition costs; and a lack of clarity in 
the application of competition law (covered earlier in this paper). Where barriers do exist the 
position of incumbents may be strengthened and reduce the level of competition and choice 
in the market. 
Entry, expansion and exit of providers 
73. Research shows that in private markets at least half of the increase in productivity over time 
arises from the exit of less productive firms and the entry of new and more productive firms. 
New providers that enter the market may offer a different, innovative service, or provide a 
service that better meets particular needs. Competition from new entrants can also act as an 
incentive for existing providers to drive up the quality of their service or face exit. 
74. In some public service markets, potential new entrants may face difficulties trying to enter the 
market. For example, small providers may be deterred by what they perceive as 
disproportionate requirements to meet existing accreditation and regulatory criteria. New 
entry and countering barriers to entry may be achieved however through a variety of means: 
 spinning services out of the public sector to create new providers in the market, 
and 
 encouraging new entrant providers by setting prices for public services that are 
neither too high (wasting taǆpaǇeƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇ), nor too low such that they would 
discourage providers from entering the market (and also potentially risk 
reducing the quality of existing provision). 
75. Public service markets may also only offer weak financial incentives to expand that act as a 
break upon strongly-performing providers͛ willingness to take over failing providers, or create 
new capacity. Funding constraints can also lead to difficult trade-offs between creating supply-
side flexibility (potentially important, for example, in making competition effective between 
schools in an area), and controlling public spending during periods of tight budgetary 
constraint. 
76. The regulatory context itself, with its restrictions and incentive arrangements imposed on 
useƌs͛ ĐhoiĐes aŶd pƌoǀideƌs ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ ŵaǇ aĐt to ƌestƌiĐt ĐhoiĐe aŶd ĐoŵpetitioŶ iŶ puďliĐ 
service markets as has happened at times and for various reasons in the regulated utilities. For 
example, in the case of registration choices for patients of GP services, until recently users were 
allowed only one choice from GPs close to their residence (and possibly close to their place of 
work). This precludes the ability of users to shop around for GP services (which in theory would 
equate to alternative providers competing for patients) in neighbouring boroughs. In addition, 
GPs are paid by the number of people registered with them, irrespective of how frequently 
patients are using the practice or the quality of the service that patients receive when they do. 
These arrangements lacked incentives for an efficient functioning market as choice and 
incentives for competition among GP practices were limited. Similarly, the establishment of 
catchment areas for schools may reduce competition between neighbouring schools once 
again restricting both choice by parents and competition among schools. 
77. Competition in public services is more likely to be effective if the incentives for providers are 
strong, rewarding success and penalising poor performance. The risk of going out of business 
can act as a powerful incentive on providers to perform well. Certain types of public service 
such as social care, have a well-established private sector and third sector provider base which 
represent the vast majority of provision in the market. Most care providers in the market are 
small and individually they may exit their local market without causing significant disruption. 
In principle the closure of poorly-performing providers is possible and does sometimes occur 
in other public services like schools and hospitals, however in reality this is unlikely to happen 
if it leaves the needs of the local population in the area inadequately provided for.  
78. Common approaches to dealing with poorly-performing state providers, particularly in health 
and education, is either to replace the existing management, or to allow another provider to 
merge with or take over its running. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the exit of a 
provider may not always be caused by poor management; it could be partially or wholly due to 
the need for a more fundamental service re-configuration, such as the consolidation or 
rationalisation of existing providers in the local area. In these circumstances, replacing the 
leadership of the school or hospital (etc.) is unlikely to provide an effective solution.  
Service continuity 
79. Public services such as health and social care aƌe esseŶtial to ŵaŶǇ people͛s liǀes and well-
being, similarly it is unacceptable from both an individual and societal perspective for other 
types of public services, such as education or probation services, to be disrupted for any length 
of time. Government has statutory duties that require it to ensure there is continuity of these 
services, and therefore to keep service disruption where it does occur to a bare minimum. 
Government however wishes to avoid providing explicit (or implicit) guarantees to support 
providers that fall into financial difficulties. If not, theƌe is the ƌisk of ͞ŵoƌal hazaƌd͟ that a 
government guarantee would weaken the incentives on providers to manage their own 
businesses effectively and maintain their financial viability, if they knew government would 
step in and bail them out if they got into financial trouble. Government therefore has to find a 
way to balance the need for poorly-performing providers to exit the market with its duty to 
ensure service continuity and protect users from service disruption. Both the financial crisis in 
ϮϬϬ8 that led to the UK͛s ǁoƌst ďaŶkiŶg Đƌisis (defining public services in the broadest sense to 
include bank accounts), and the Southern Cross Healthcare debacle in 2011 revealed an 
important feature of markets in public services, where service provision is in real danger of 
seǀeƌe disƌuptioŶ the state has to step iŶ aŶd it ďeĐoŵes the ͞pƌoǀideƌ of last ƌesoƌt͟.  
80. IŶ ŵaŶǇ seĐtoƌs of the eĐoŶoŵǇ theƌe aƌe foƌŵal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs foƌ oǀeƌsight of a pƌoǀideƌ͛s 
fiŶaŶĐial ͞health͟ at the ŶatioŶal leǀel. These sectors include travel (aviation and tour 
operators), energy, rail and health. This oversight is necessary because it is unacceptable for 
individuals to be left without the services they need or have paid for, or because the removal 
of these services could have a negative impact on the well-being of that individual. In addition, 
the need for oversight may be particularly relevant where providers adopt high-risk business 
plans that make them vulnerable to economic downturns, credit squeezes etc. or where 
providers have a relatively high level of market penetration. The failure of Southern Cross 
demonstrated the risk a major business failure can pose to both the quality of care that people 
receive and to the continuity of those care services. It also led to significant concern and 
distress among the people receiving services, their families and carers. In the event the risk to 
the continuity of care was largely managed but this outcome was not a forgone conclusion and 
was the result of considerable effort by a number of organisations and individuals, without 
formal processes and powers to call upon. As a result it convinced Government that adult social 
care should also have formal mechanisms in place to ensure service continuity for all social 
care users. 10 
 
81. An oversight system to capture early warnings where a large or difficult-to-replace provider is 
facing financial difficulties, and to take action to stop the situation deteriorating, are an 
important feature of public service continuity regimes. Figure 5 provides an illustration of the 
oversight regime in social care at the local level, and the proposed national oversight regime. 
 
Figure 5: Service continuity in social care  
 
In the social care market there are many small providers, it is clear that when these providers 
exit or face closure, the local authority has a responsibility to talk to local providers and to 
work with them if they decide a service must close to ensure that people are given the 
necessary support to arrange alternative care. However in the social care market, there are a 
number of medium and large providers of care, operating across large parts of the UK, on a 
significant scale. The impact of such a provider failing would affect many parts of the country 
and it is not reasonable to expect individual local authorities to manage the situation. National 
coordination and oversight is needed. Keeping abreast of the commercial negotiations that 
occur if a major company has to be wound up cannot be done effectively at the local level. 
The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ĐoŶsultatioŶ iŶ ϮϬϭϯ oŶ oǀeƌsight iŶ adult soĐial Đaƌe ƌeĐogŶised the strong 
need for a regulator to take on the role of overseeing those care providers whose services, for 
whatever reason, would be hard to replace if failure occurred. 
 
Ensuring the market is delivering the public policy objectives 
82. Using markets to deliver public services does not mean that goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s responsibilities for 
achieving policy objectives cost-effectively are diluted. Yet market delivery involves provision 
by non-public-sector entities, which are not directly accountable to government or the 
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taxpayer. This lack of influence means that government must design the legislative framework 
of rules for the market, monitor its overall financial sustainability and ensure that system-wide 
the provision of public services is effective, value for money, and achieving goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s policy 
objectives.  
 
83. To fulfil this systemic role government must be prepared to:  monitor and intervene, where appropriate, to calibrate central funding, depending on 
the national balance of supply and demand, and taking account of the patterns of 
regional variation (and levels of spare capacity).  assess the likely impact of policy reforms and possible future scenarios in terms of 
their likely impact on policy objectives.   develop an understanding at the national level of the market structure, including 
market size and concentration levels; as well as the degree of exposure to publicly-
funded users, price and quality variations and trends, rates of entry and exit, and 
significant merger and acquisition activity.  work with the competition authorities and relevant quality and sector regulators, to 
raise awareness, standards and enforce rules and the right market behaviour.   
  
84. Departments that have oversight responsibilities for market delivery of public services may also 
consider adopting a presumption that they should actively review the delivery of public services 
through market mechanisms on a periodic basis. Such a review could be undertaken by or in 
consultation with the Competition and Markets Authority, or in the case of NHS-funded 
healthcare, with Monitor. If the results of the review suggest that significant user detriment 
exists, government may need to decide on appropriate remedies or be prepared to consider 
referral of the market for more detailed investigation.  Ultimately if a public service market fails, 
it ǁill ďe the state ǁho ƌetaiŶs the ƌole as ͚pƌoǀideƌ of last ƌesoƌt͛.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
